Preface to Totality and Infinity IN; Quodlibet Journal: Volume 5 Number 4, October 2003 Throughout his works Emmanuel Levinas
has used various terminologies to refer to God. In every case God is
described as infinite unknowable, unsayable and unsignifyable. In the
Trace of the Face Levinas refers to God as the Unknown and absolute other (Emmanuel Levinas
Trace of the Face Translated by A Linglis,
Tijdschrift Philosophie 1963 {text pages. 610-623}, pp.345, 354-356).
In Totality and Infinity,
Levinas calls God the absolute other and in Otherwise
than Being he uses the term the otherwise than being (Totality and Infinity. Dickens University Press, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. 2001 pp. 34-35, Otherwise
than Being or Beyond Essence. Duquesne University Press,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 2000 pp. 4-5). I will show that these concepts
are completely compatible with one another and are based on the same
premises. Furthermore, it will be argued that term God is a phrase or
ideatum that refers to that which cannot be known, signified, or contained
in any expression of language. Levinas God will be shown to everything that can never
be known or said. This God is not the personal deity depicted in typical
religiosity, Levinas God is not a divinity that interacts
with the human world, rather this God is that which lies beyond the
limits of what humans can ever experience or know. It will be shown
that the term God as found in Levinas work can be easily substituted
by any other term that refers to that which is beyond everything contained
within that which can be known.. Thus, I will prove that Levinas use
of the terms infinite, the unknown, the absolute other and the otherwise
than being to refer to the same non-religious God or the something that
is absolutely beyond being. The term God refers to that which a secular
term like infinity could as easily be used to referred to without losing
any of its intended connotations lost in the substitution of one term
for the other.. In fact, I will show that the term God is
more problematic than its secular counterparts as it contains religious
presuppositions that are not contained in Levinas formulation of that
which lies beyond being. In this sense, Levinas terms for God secularize
divinity and relegate God to a concept acceptable even to atheists.
This is not the God of religion rather a term used as an ideatum of
that which is always beyond what humans will ever know. This God who
will never fulfil any of the characteristics usually attributed to God
and even if God did, no one would ever know it. I will commence by examining the idea
of the unknown as presented by Levinas in The Trace of the Face.
Levinas begins by claiming that the self has a horizon made up of the
totality of everything it knows. When the self encounters another it
attempts to absorb the alterity of what it encounters in to the selfs horizon (Trace of the Face"
pp. 345-346). When one encounters something that is yet to be known,
one encompasses that unknown within ones horizon making it the known. As one encounters more of the unknown, the
illeity of the unknown steps away and the newly encountered other becomes
absorbed into the self as the known. The unknown leaves a trace of its
existence in the transition of unknown to known. This is similar to
fingerprints left at the scene of the crime that point to the presence
of someone that is no longer there. However, the fingerprints of the
unknown have been wiped away because the instance the unknown becomes
the known it loses all traces that it was unknown. The known is no longer
evidence of the unknown the moment it becomes the known ("Trace
of the Face" pp.354-356). When the self encounters another person,
the self comes face to face with that other and realizes that other
resists being absorbed into the selfs horizon. The self is limited to experiencing
the others physical manifestations and expressions
but can never know the hidden secrets that lie behind the face of the
other. The self realizes that no matter how much one learns about the
other what lies within that other always remains unknown (Trace of the Face" pp. 345, 354-356). Furthermore,
one realizes that no matter what one encounters as an unknown and encompasses
it into the self as the known, the unknown, which continues to lie beyond
the known and remains perpetually the unknown. The Unknown, according
to Levinas, is God or the absolute other that is always outside the
grasp of the self ("Trace of the Face" pp. 354-357). When
one encounters the other and realizes the unknowable, one transcends
to a face to face with the absolute other, which is the unknown. One
comes face to face with the edge of ones own horizon and the illeity of that which always
lies beyond ("Trace of the Face" pp. 354-358). One faces the
concept of the perpetual unknown, which, like the face of the other,
hides its unknowable nature beyond the grasp of the self. Nothing can
be said about the unknown, thus it is unsayable. The content of the
unknown is unsignifyable and cannot be encompassed by language or by
any symbol ("Trace of the Face" 345-347) The perpetual unknown is infinite.
No matter what one encounters and absorbs into ones horizon the unknown continually exists and remains infinite beyond the
selfs horizon. What lies beyond the limits
of the known will always be infinite and unknown ("Trace of the
Face" pp. 354-358) This seems to suggest that part of the infinity
of the unknown can be encompassed within the known and made finite within
ones horizon. However, Levinas seems to also imply
the unknown is always unknown and always stands outside the horizon
of the known as the infinite unknown. The unknown is perpetually unknowable..
In its totality the unknown is always absolutely other to the self.
The trace it leaves behind as the self absorbs more of the unknown into
the selfs horizon is a trace of evidence that erases itself
and only exists in the moment of transition when something unknown becomes
known (Trace of the face pp. 353-368). Thus, one can only realize the
dichotomy between the unknown and the known at the moment of transition
from the former to the latter. That is one has to look back at an occurrence
when one learns something unknown and made it the known to be able to
extrapolate the idea of the unknown. This seems to imply that what is
unknown can one day become known, yet if there will always be an unknown
the idea of the unknown will always exist.. In fact, the unknown will
never be known. The unknown and the known are always different. When
something becomes known it is no longer unknown, and what becomes known
must have always had the potential of being known. However, the unknown
also refers to that which can never be known, that is the unknown also
refers to the unknowable. The unknowable will never be part of that
which can be known. That which can never be known must be and has always
been unknowable. Its absolute alterity is always beyond the selfs horizon. In fact, it is absolutely
other to anything anyone can know. Thus, the unknown is comprised of
that which can and cannot be known. (" The Trace of the Face"352-356)
Since the unknown is infinite, that is infinitely capable of stepping
away from the approach of the selfs horizon, what is unknowable and what
is potentially knowable are both included within the infinity of the
unknown. God is part of unknowable aspect of the unknown. No part of
God ever becomes known. God is the unknowable unknown that can not be
signified or said, God is always beyond what can be known ("Trace
of the Face" pp. 354-358). Thus, God and the potentially knowable
are both part of the unknown and while these constituents of the unknown
remain unknown for all intense and purposes they can be considered part
and parcel of the Unknown.. One can equally not speech of that which
is unknowable and that which is not yet known, However, since what can
be known is part of Being and God is absolutely other to being, that
which will never be known, like God, is absolutely other to the yet
known. The yet unknown has the potential of being known and thus part
of Being. The unknowable is unknown because it is beyond Being. Thus,
since God is beyond Being, God must be part of the unknowable aspect
of the Unknown. Levinas more extensively examines the infinite, unknowable
unknown in Totality and Infinity as well as, giving a more in-depth
explication of the transcendent experience caused by the face to face
with the other which allows for the realization of the absolute otherness
of the unknowable. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas
claims that infinity is a good term for the absolute other or God. Infinity
is an ideatum for the absolute other or God. An ideatum is a term used
to point or refers to something without attempting to encompass it,
make reference to its content or claim to know anything about it. An
ideatum does not signify an object of being, rather it refers to that
which cannot be signified and lies beyond being (Totality and Infinity
p.45). Infinity refers to a concept that is beyond human comprehension.
The human mind is incapable of grasping infinity in its totality. The
term infinity is a finite signification of a concept that overflows
the bounds of its signification (Totality and Infinityp..25). The term
absolute other is an ideatum that points to that which is beyond all
existence. The absolute other is absolutely alterior to all of being
(Totality and Infinity pp. 42-43, 49, 51-51 74-75). The absolute other
is concept that overflows the bounds of its signification. The absolute
other is beyond totality and is absolutely other to everything that
can be known or signified (74-75). The absolute other is not a non-being
and cannot be derived by negating the idea of being. Non-being is predicated
on the idea of being and depends on the idea of being for its derivation.
Thus, non-being is not absolutely other to Being. Non-being is derived
from being and is thusly part of what humans can know. (Totality and
Infinity pp.. 40-42). One transcends to the realization of
the absolute other when the selfs idea of totality
becomes disrupted by the presence of the face of the other (pp.35-36,
42-43 85-87). The face of the other is the limit of the experience of
that other (Totality and Infinity 35-36). However, the other who faces
me is more than what I can sense. The other holds hidden secrets that
are beyond my senses, beyond the others face that I face. The others expressions hint at this hidden alterity while
never making certain what is hidden in the other, behind and beyond
the others face (Totality and Infinity pp. 80-81).
Unlike the objects the self encounters and absorbs into the self, the
other resists being absorbed by the self (pp.42-43). The self realizes
that the other who resists absorption into the self has a hidden alterity
that is equally capable to act in the world as the self does, though
the relationship of different selves is asymmetrical (Totality and Infinity
pp. 39 215-216). The hidden alterity of the other makes the self approach
the other cautiously as the self cannot know what intentions the other
holds. The self becomes conscious of the other as a self like ones self, which is also not the self. If the other is a self like ones self, capable of similar feats, then the self
must be approached as one who is easily capable of murdering someone
as befriending them (Totality and Infinity 37-39, 48-52, 70) Since birth, the self has absorbed
everything it has encountered into the self. The horizon of the self
continually absorbs everything it encounters into an idea of totality
based on the same (Totality and Infinity pp. 35-37). The others otherness is absorbed into the self based on the ontological sameness
that other has according to everything else the self has already absorbed.
This sameness is an ontology which predicates everything based on being
or as things are. What is absorbed is understood on the basis
of its existence (pp. 42-48). Ones idea of totality
is based on Being. Thus, the self absorbs and orders everything it encounters
into an ontology of the same or a totality of everything that exists
based on the fact of existence. The predicated of ontology is existence
or being. Thus, each self contains an idea of totality based on the
ontological precedent of existence. Even God is said by many to exist
and have being. However Levinas does not believe that God, the Infinite,
has any part in Being (Totality and Infinity pp.25, 48-52). The absolute
other is absolutely alterior to Being and thus has no being predicated
on the idea of Being (Totality and Infinity pp. 74-75). When a self encounters the other and
engages in a conversation concerning the idea of totality, the self
and other realize that each persons idea of totality differs (Totality
and Infinity pp. 42-45, 49). This causes a disruption in each person's
idea of totality. The other offering the alternative idea of totality
does not need to be a living person, rather any book or medium that
presents an idea of totality as its message can stand in for the absent
author that is not immediately present (Totality and Infinity 74-75).
A book stands in for the face of the author who, like a living other
person that one faces, expresses an alterity hidden beyond the grasp
of the selfs senses and understanding (Totality and Infinity pp. 80-81). When one
realizes that ones idea of totality
is different than any others, ones idea of totality and the ability to ever know this totality comes into
question. The entire idea of a knowable totality becomes disrupted.
The self realizes that there is something to each selfs idea of totality that is irreconcilable with any other idea of totality.
Moreover, one realizes that there is something about totality that eludes
the grasp of everyone (Totality and Infinity 42-45, 49). Furthermore,
since one becomes aware that all ideas of totality have irreconcilable
differences, one realizes that there is an absolute otherness to totality
that causes everyone to derive their own idea of it. One becomes conscious
of fact that there is something unsignifyable about totality that no
one can grasp yet everyone derives a different idea of it (Totality
and Infinity pp. 35-40). At the moment ones idea of totality becomes disrupted in the face
to face with the other one transcends to an experience of the face to
face with the absolute other (Totality and Infinity pp. 74-77). The
face to face with the absolute other is the realization of the existence
of an absolute alterity beyond totality and Being. The absolute other
is unknowable and unsignifyable. Moreover, it is absolutely other to
everything that can ever be known or hypothesized about (Totality and
Infinity pp. 74-75). The face of the other points to the face of the
absolute other. The face of the other acts like an ideatum to the face
of the absolute other. That is, the face to face with the other that
leads to the face to face with the unsignifyable alterity of the absolute
other acts like an ideatum or concept that does not and, in fact, cannot
encompass what it points to: the absolute other. The face of the absolute
other is an ideatum that only assumes the existence of that which cannot
be known and lies beyond Being (Totality and Infinity pp. 42-43, 49,
51-52). The absolute other is the infinite Other or God. When one comes
face to face with the absolute other one encounters the silence of its
unsayable alterity (Totality and Infinity pp. 50-54, 84-91). The absolute
other is the Unknown and is unknowable. The selfs idea of totality
finds itself in jeopardy before the unknowable alterity of the absolute
other and the ungraspable otherness of totality (Totality and Infinity
pp. 42-48, 86-88- 198, 231-233). The ungraspable otherness of totality
and the absolute otherness of the absolute other are not the same. The
ungraspable totality of being is still a predicate of existence as it
relies on existents for its existence while the absolute other lies
beyond the ungraspable totality of being and does not rely on any existents
for its existence. The ungraspable otherness of totality acts as the
face or ideatum to the absolute other (Totality and Infinity pp.35-40,
49). The self who realizes that the selfs idea of totality is in jeopardy can choose to
either embrace the others alterity as part of the self, accepting the
ethical equality of difference and the inevitable fact that no idea
of totality is complete and compatible with any other, or the self may
attempt to erase the difference that caused the dilemma to begin with
by either trying to change the others ideas of totality making the other
conform with the selfs idea of being or murder the other
and eliminating the contentious difference altogether(Totality and Infinity
pp. 39, 42-48, 84-91, 198, 231-233). When one accepts the differences
of the other as an inevitable part of the self, the others differences become part of selfs idea of everyones being. When one embraces the other
like a neighbour who shares the same neighbourhood of being while residing
in a different home and consequently having his or her own relative
perspective concerning totality one embraces the other in an ethical
relationship (Totality and Infinity 36-37). This acceptance of the other
is the acceptance of the equal incapability that everyone shares to
signify totality and the absolute other (Totality and Infinity p.39).
The realization of the ethical relationship entails a relinquishing
of ones freedom and
will to power concerning ones hegemony over
the idea of totality (Totality and Infinity pp.84-91). Thusly, the self
becomes humbled before the absolute other and the other that faces the
self. This humility is caused by the realization of God, not as a personal
being capable of punishing unethical behavior, rather as the infinite
unknowable that allows one to realize the limits of ones power (Totality
and Infinity pp. 35-40). Whether there is a heaven or a hell beyond
can never be known though the fact that no one can hold hegemony over
the idea of totality can be realised. Thus, the absolute other does
not impart virtue as a lesson from the beyond rather the beyond fosters
the ethical relationship in the face of the other that shares an equal
position of powerlessness before the absolute other. This God need not
be a living divinity rather this God simply is a term referring to the
unknowable that can humble a transcending self before the other by allowing
for the realization that one can never know or signify this absolute
other. This God does not judge human behavior rather the judgement of
morality becomes the responsibility of the self in the presence of the
other (Totality and Infinity pp.. 245-247). Morality is a response to
the demands of the other (Totality and Infinity pp.87-89). Ethics is
a product of the humbling of humanity before humanity as it realises
the limits of its power and not the divine dictates of a superior being.. If the self does not embrace the humility
before the absolute other accepting, ones powerlessness before the other and one continues to feel that ones idea of totality is threatened by the other,
one might attempt to erase the other who caused the disruption to ones idea of totality and consequently erase the
threat to ones idea of totality altogether.
This erasure is accomplished by resorting to what Levinas calls a tyranny
of ontology and the violence this tyranny usually entails towards the
other.. One either attempts to change the others ideas making them conform to ones own ideas concerning totality or one tries to
murder and outright rid oneself of the contentious difference of the
other by eliminating the other altogether. This tyranny of ontology
persecutes difference and violates the sanctity of the others alterity (Totality and Infinity pp. 42-48, 86-88, 198, 231-233). This
unethical behavior is not a conscious rebellion against the laws of
God. Since God does not interact with Being and remains outside the
scope of human life, even if God has laws humans will never know them.
Unethical behavior is not impiety, rather it is an attempt to avoid
accepting ones powerlessness before the other and the absolute
other. It is an attempt at maintaining ones power concerning the hegemony over the idea of Being. Whatever is the
unknowable content of the absolute other, its disruptive quality realised
at the moment of transcendence is the cause of ethical and unethical
behaviour. The infinite unknowable absolute other does not dictate the
rules of morality. Ethics is an immanent characteristic innate in humanity
that manifests itself when humans realize the limits of their power
to know and control everything. Immorality is not a sin against the
absolute other, rather it is a sin against the other in the face of
the absolute other Immorality is not as St. Augustine argued a digression
from Gods perfection,
rather it is a product of the forced maintenance of the false perfection
of the selfs idea of totality (ST. Augustine On
Free Choice of the Will Trans. Thomas Williams Hachette Publishing
Company, Indianapolis USA 1993 pp. 2-4).
Levinas ideatum of infinity as presented in
Totality and Infinity seems to indicate a concept that is beyond
any finite set or idea and overflows any reference to it. The illeity
does not present itself in the trace, this infinity is not an other
that slowly becomes encompassed into the self while its infinite nature
continues to stretch out beyond it. The absolute other does not step
away as one approaches it. The absolute other is an infinity that overflows
the concept of infinity. It is an infinity of infinity. Infinity is
not simply what has yet to be placed within the finite. This infinity
is infinitys infinity and
always is infinite no matter what has already been absorbed within the
self. Thus, the absolute other is not or ever was part of the other.
It is not a divinity that interacts with existence and thus can never
be known. The other has the possibility of being encountered as part
of Being by the virtue of its own existence, while the absolute other
can only be encountered by the virtue of the face to face with the other
that causes the transcendent encounter of the face to face with the
absolute other. One does not interact with the absolute
other in the manner one would interact with the other. The other is
manifest while the absolute other is always absent though always immanent.
The disruption of totality in the face of the other acts as the ideatum
to the absolute other which one only becomes conscious of as that which
is beyond the limits of Being One does not face the absolute other as
a physical manifestation. One faces the concept of the unknowable infinity
of infinity that is beyond comprehension and any chance of direct encounter
(Totality and Infinity pp. 34, 37,39, 42, 48-49 51-58). One can touch
the other but one can never touch the absolute other. This ideatum of
the idea of the absolute alterity of the absolute other which is absolutely
other to all of being is extensively elucidated by Levinas in his book
Otherwise Than Being In Otherwise than Being and
Beyond Essence, Levinas claims that the otherwise than being
is otherwise to everything that is being and everything that is not
being. The otherwise than being is not the same as the philosophic negation
of being into non-being (Otherwise than Being pp.3-4). Platos idea of a not being is predicated on the idea of being and necessitates
the idea of being for its realization. The idea of not being relies
on the idea of being. Philosophical interests in being and not being
does not lead to the otherwise than being (Otherwise than Being p.5)
The otherwise than being is not negation. It is not derivable based
on the predication of being. It is not a non-being that is realized
as a contradiction to being. The otherwise than being is otherwise to
everything that can be derived from Being (Otherwise than Being pp.
4-5, 16-17). When one comes face to face with another
person ones idea of being becomes interrupted
(Otherwise than Being pp.93-94. Each persons understanding of the saying and the said becomes interrupted in the face
of the other. The saying refers to the manner in which ideas are conveyed
in language.. The said refers to the content of the saying or that which
is indicated by the significations of the saying (Otherwise than Being
pp. 5-7). There are many different sayings for the same said and this
becomes especially evident in a conversation with another person concerning
being and especially if that other speaks a different language (Otherwise
than Being pp. 34-38). For example, the word red is a saying of the said sense perception of that colour.. The word red is the English
term that signifies the sense perception of this colour. Kokinno is the Greek term for the same sense perception. Red and kokinno are different sayings referring to the same said. The saying and the said
are not equivalent. They are linked to each other while sharing a diachronous
relationship.. In everyday use the saying and the said seem to share
a direct synchronous relationship.. However, they can be extracted into
separate concepts (Otherwise than Being pp.. 5-9). The interruption
of the other causes one to become conscious of the diachronous unity
of the saying and said. Without an interruption to ones idea of being
the saying and said seem to share a synchronous relationship and often
are used by people as if the saying and the said were the same thing.
(Otherwise than Being pp. 41-51). The said is subsumed in the saying
and presents itself as a unified concept. The interruption of the other
allows one to realize that the saying and the said, which seem to share
a synchronic relationship, are actually diachronically related. Consequently,
One is able to extract the otherwise than being from the said in which
it comes to signify a being otherwise by tracing the protention of the
said to the primordial saying. Since language did not simply develop
based on the intention of signification, one cannot simply extract the
otherwise than being from a synchronous understanding of the said and
saying. The primordial saying is the preoriginal
and is the prelinguistic signification that refers to the entirety of
the said (Otherwise than Being pp. 5-9). Without delineation in language,
the prelinguistic primordial saying referred to everything. Since every
saying could have originally been used to signify any said and any said
can be referred to by any saying, one realizes that there must be something
that exists beyond the totality of the said, something that is absolutely
other to the said.. That which is absolutely other to the totality of
the said is the otherwise than being. The primordial sayings content is the entirety of the said. The said in this sense is Being.
One realizes in the primordial saying that the otherwise than being
was excluded, while its presence is immanent in it. The otherwise than
being is completely excluded from the primordial saying while capable
of being extracted from its primordial state. Everything
that is otherwise to the totality of the said, that being Being, cannot
be said but one can use a saying to indicate it. That is one can use
a saying to signify the acknowledgement of the existence of the otherwise
than being that has no said. The otherwise than being is beyond any
said. One cannot refer to the content of the otherwise than being because
the idea of content is predicated on being and the otherwise than being
has nothing to do with Being. One extracts the otherwise than being
from the realization of the primordial saying which is the totality
of that which can be said, but is otherwise to it. The term otherwise
than being is a saying without a said. This saying of the otherwise
than being without a said is an ideatum. The primordial saying was the
saying that had the entirety of the said as its content and had no particular
said separated from the totality of the said. The otherwise than being
is extracted from the said as that which is not present in the primordial
saying or the totality of the said (Otherwise than Being pp. 5-7 45-51).
When one realizes this, ones interest or idea of essence, passes from being
to that of the otherwise than being, not otherwise as in the sense of
that which is not being, but otherwise than that which can be thought
of because of being and the said. Transcendences meaning is the signification of passing from the event of being to the
otherwise than being. Transcendence is the realization of the otherwise
than being when interest passes from the entirety of Being to that which
is beyond Being and is consequently unknowable (Otherwise than Being
p. 3). The movement of interest from being
to the otherwise that being is metaphysical (Otherwise than Being153-162).
This movement of interest from essence to the beyond essence is what
Levinas in Totality and Infinity calls the idea of Desire. In
Totality and Infinity Levinas explains that Desire is
bent towards the elsewhere or other. Desire is aimed towards the beyond
all existence. Metaphysics is geared towards a yonder. Metaphysical
desire is geared to an absolute other. Need is at the basis of desire
(Totality and Infinity p. 33). Need is a Desire for completeness, a
desire that is never simply satisfied based on the existents one encounters.
Desire is deepened in the face of the other. This Desire is not of distance.
The remoteness of the Other is not bridged by Desire. Metaphysics is
not a movement to the Other as an existent. Desire is absolute if desirer
is mortal and the desired is invisible (Totality and Infinity p. 34).
Nowadays God or the Other is not placed in the heavens rather He is
considered invisible and immanent. This immanence is absolutely beyond
all existents (Totality and Infinity p. 34-35). Absolute Desire is for
the absolute other. Intention is a movement to make things concrete
by adaquation. Vision is adaquation of the idea with the thing it signifies,
the saying and the said respectfully. The alterity of the Other can
not be adequated The alterity of the other has meaning as the alterity
of the other. The alterity of the Other is not the face of the Other,
though its content is its alterity (Totality and Infinity p.34, 39).
Any attempt to signify the alterity of the Other is an attempt to encompass
the infinite alterity within the finite existents. The otherness of
Other comprises the content of metaphysics. Metaphysical interest is
transcendence.. Transcendence is the simple presence of the self to
the self. Distance is the existing of Being, a distance of self apart
from self. The relationship of self and Other is the focus
of transcendence (Totality and Infinity p. 35) Transcendence is a movement
to concreteness based on the content of metaphysics. The Other can not
be adequated but can be signified using a neutral term that functions
as an ideatum to the existence of the alterity of the other without
attempting to encompass it (Totality and Infinity p. 37,42). As mentioned
above, Levinas claims the term infinity is an ideatum or idea that points
to the alterity of the Other that cannot be signified (Totality and
Infinity p. 49). The word infinity indicates an idea which in itself
overflows the bounds of its own conception. Infinitys perfection can not be adequate in the same way
one would signify a finite object. Infinity points to that which can
not be encompassed or grasped in its entirety by the human mind (Totality
and Infinity p. 25). Thus, speaking of an unsignifyable absolute other
is an ideatum of that which cannot be said. It is the pointing to an
infinite alterity that one realises cannot be signified.
No theory of totality can ever encompass the alterity of the other.
However, a theory that takes this into account can acknowledge the existence
of an unsignifyable absolute other that lies beyond all human signification
while making no claim to any knowledge concerning its content (Totality
and Infinity pp. 48-52) Such a theory would be a saying without a said.
The formulation of Infinity, the absolute other, the Unknown, and the
otherwise than being are sayings without a said that refer to the same
unknowable, unsignifyable otherness beyond being.
Thus Transcendence causes ones interest to become metaphysical desire.
Ones interest moves from being and everything
that can be said to that which is beyond being and its essence This
interest is geared towards that which is completely separate from Being
and was never part of Being: the otherwise than being Otherwise than
Being pp. 8-11). Levinas claims that the otherwise than
being is infinity, an infinity that leaves no trace in being. This infinity
has no part in finitude. The saying and the said are both infinite but
do not share the otherwise than beings infinity of
infinity (Otherwise than Being 5-9, 11-14). The saying is infinite in
the sense that there are infinite ways to say things, yet one could
argue that if one took the entirety of the sayings that people have
spoken that there has been a finite number of them. However, since there
is an infinite potential to say things in different ways, including
ways that have yet to occur, the saying is infinite within the infinite
set of Being. The totality of the said or Being is finite while the
particulars that comprise the said are infinite. There are an infinite
number of objects or the said within the finite concept of the totality
of Being. The otherwise than being is infinite in the sense that it
is beyond the limits of anything finite because it does not take part
in the finite. Finitude is a concept of being and plays no role in the
predication of the infinity of the otherwise than being, though it does
play a role in the idea of infinity found in the idea of the saying
and the said. The infinity of the infinite lives in going backwards.
It is realized as a responsibility that stands outside of essence. It
is a conversion of the response to the infinite as one approaches the
other. This infinity is non-thematizable exceeds every capacity and
is only manifested in reverse as the tracing mentioned above, as a breaking
point caused by the approach to the other which exceeds the essence
of being, This infinity wipes away any trace of its own existence, and
transcends the present. It does not act or interact with being. It humbles
the self that transcends to realize it, in the same way one is humbled
by the absolute other referred to by Levinas in Totality and
Infinity. The self is held hostage in the face
of the other and is responsible to that other. This responsibility is
the ethical relationship of the self to the other (Otherwise than Being
11-14, 19, 93-94, 140-149,193). The idea of an infinity of infinity
or an infinity that neither plays a role in the finite nor is influenced
by the finite seems to be an ongoing trend in Levinas work. Inasmuch as it can be misconstrued that the infinite is that which
lies beyond the horizon of the unknown and slowly becomes assimilated
into totality as it becomes known. The infinite that Levinas refers
to is beyond the knowable and beyond everything that humanity is capable
of signifying or ever knowing. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas
claims that the idea of infinity is the best ideatum to refer to that
which cannot be encompassed by any signification (Totality and Infinity
37, 42-49). It is a saying without a said based on the movement of interest
from being to that which is otherwise than being. (Otherwise than Being
pp. 5-9) Whatever this infinity may be no one will ever know. If it
is God it is more akin to deism than any interactive concept of a personal
God usually proffered by most world religions. This God does not act
in creation as propertied by religions like Judaism and Christianity.
The tradition characteristics attributed
to God become problematic in the face of the premises Levinas uses to
refer to the unknowable beyond Being or what he calls God. Traditionally
God is described as Omnipresent, Omniscient, Omnipotent and all good
(Augustine pp. xi-xix). Since Levinas God does not interact with the world
of being and being is the bases of the known, God remains unknowable.
Even if Levinas God had any of the above-mentioned
attributes no one within Being, such as a living human, would ever know
it. For example, an omnipotent God that does not act in
Being will never be known for His powers. However, In Totality and
Infinity Levinas describes the absolute other as immanent in everyones dwelling. In this sense, the immanence of Gods presence is a type of omnipresence. Yet this presence is not divine rather
it connotes the potential of realising the absolute other as an immanent
realization of that which is beyond being and is immanently present
to everyone in their dwelling (Totality and Infinity pp. 153-156). Thus,
Levinas God is not a living God present everywhere, rather
the omnipresence of the absolute other is the imminent realization of
immanence of the ever present unknowable aspect of everything that is
knowable and leads to the realization of the absolute other in the face
to face with the other. This presence is not a religious understanding
of a God that is everywhere and nowhere, but the secular ideatum referring
to the unknowable aspect that everything has, a aspect which overflows
the limits of being and the knowable. As Levinas claims in Totality
and Infinity, this God is better worshipped in silenced without
any type of homage than worshipped with any sense of piety (Totality
and Infinity pp. 53-60). Since this God does not interact with the world
and does not interact directly with humanity it does not need to be
worshipped. For Levinas other terms like infinity are less stigmatized
with religiosity and less problematic when used to describe the beyond
being than the use of the word God. Infinity does not connotate the
religious descriptions attributed to God. In fact, Levinas promotes
the use of other terms as ideatums to the absolute other that contain
no prejudicial religious connotations (Totality and Infinity pp. 37,42,49).
Levinas God is a secular ideal that acts like an ideatum to the unknowable
absolute other that is otherwise than being and can as easily be called
God as any other term referring to the same unknowable otherness without
detracting from the concept of it. In fact, the term God detracts more
from Levinas concept of the absolute other than do any of the other
secular terms Levinas uses. The term God seems to personify the beyond
being into a superior being rather than referring to the beyond without
trying to attribute or describe anything to it. In conclusion, I have shown that the
Unknown, Infinity, the absolute other and the otherwise than being are
compatible with a secularized idea of God. These terms, including God,
are ideatums which are used by Levinas to refer to that which cannot
be contain in any expression of knowledge or language. Levinas God is everything that can never be known or said. This God is not the
personal deity typical of religiosity. Levinas God is not a divinity that interacts with the human world causing the
great feats described in many religions.. Rather this God is that which
lies beyond the limits of what humans can ever know or interact with.
It has been shown that the term God in Levinas work can be easily
substituted by any term that refers to that which is beyond everything
contained within that which can be known. The term God refers to that
which a secular term like infinity could be used to referred to without
losing any of its intended connotations. In fact, I have
show that the term God is more problematic than its secular counterparts
as he term God contains religious presuppositions that are not contained
in Levinas formulation of that which lies beyond Being. In this sense,
Levinas terms for the beyond Being or God secularize divinity and relegates
God to a concept acceptable to even Atheists. This is not
the God of religion rather it is a term used as an ideatum of that which
is always beyond what humans will ever know. This God will never fulfil
any of the characteristics usually attributed to God and even if God
did, according to Levinas formulations of God as completely unknowable,
no one would ever know it. |
http://www.quodlibet.net/petridis-levinas.shtml